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 Introduction 
 Moebius Syndrome (MS) and schizophrenia may initially seem to have 
little to do with one another. Th e former is a rare congenital neuro-
logical disorder primarily characterized by bilateral facial paralysis and 
lateral eye movement incapacity; the latter is a psychotic disorder, typi-
cally involving delusion or hallucination, with largely unknown etiology. 
However, closer examination of the  experience of individuals with MS 
and schizophrenia, respectively, reveals some intriguing points of conver-
gence—along with some important divergences, too. Th ese  convergences 
tend to revolve around the way individuals with MS and schizophrenia 
experience their embodiment and aff ectivity. 
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 In this comparative study, we examine such experiential  manifestations 
in MS and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological 
resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand 
what it’s like to live with these conditions and that such an understand-
ing may have therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort 
of   phenomenologically informed comparative analysis of pathological 
conditions can shed light on the importance of embodiment and aff ec-
tivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal  relatedness 
in normal conditions. Such conclusions, we believe, off er important 
resources for continued research at the intersection of phenomenology 
and cognitive science in the twenty-fi rst century. 
 Phenomenological Structures of Embodiment 
and Affectivity 
 Phenomenologists argue that distinctively human forms of thought, 
perception, and aff ect are profoundly shaped by both the sort of bodies 
we have and the things they can do. Th e body (and its sensorimotor 
capacities) anchors us in our world and, as we shall see, acts as a media-
tor enabling the world to appear to us, experientially, in characteris-
tic ways. Phenomenological approaches to the body are particularly 
interested in articulating the lived structures of embodiment; they are 
concerned with investigating how various dimensions of embodiment 
are  experienced . Th is experiential orientation leads phenomenologists 
to famously distinguish between two dimensions or modes of embodi-
ment: (1) the body through which we pre-refl ectively live, that is, the 
body considered as a  subject ( Leib ); and (2) the body thematically per-
ceived by me and by others, that is, the body considered as an  object 
( Körper ). 1 
 Th e body-as-subject refers to the way that embodiment is lived 
through from the fi rst-person perspective. From this perspective, 
the body is not something explicitly perceived or refl ected on—in 
the manner, for example, that we might critically scrutinize parts of 
our body and vow to get more exercise. In the latter case, where the 
body receives explicit thematic attention, we are concerned with the 
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body-as- object . By contrast, the body-as-subject is not really a con-
tent of experience but rather a tacit, pre-refl ective structure that  orga-
nizes experience. By ‘pre-refl ective’, phenomenologists simply mean to 
characterize the manner in which the body is implicitly present as we 
perceive and act on the world, dynamically shaping both what we expe-
rience and how we experience it. In this sense, the body-as-subject, at 
least when  functioning optimally, serves as the transparent medium for 
experience. 2 
 For example, when we see and reach for a mug of coff ee on our desk, 
we don’t fi rst consciously locate our arms in space and then intention-
ally adjust our posture and monitor our movements as we initiate and 
carry through with the reach.  We simply reach for the mug . We’re able to 
spontaneously do so because of the transparent background work of the 
body-as-subject. Due to ongoing information from proprioceptive and 
kinaesthetic processes (along with visual and tactile information), we 
are pre-refl ectively aware of the location of our limbs without needing 
explicitly to attend to our body on a moment-to-moment basis. To use 
language that will be important later, we enjoy an immediate experi-
ential  intimacy with our body and its attendant capacities. Moreover, 
based upon our spatial position and bodily capacities, we are also aware 
of what sort of movements and actions are possible within a given 
space. Th e body is thus always tacitly present and poised for action. Th e 
lived body (or the body-as-subject) in this way serves as our anchored 
 fi rst-person perspective on the world, grounding our egocentric frame of 
spatial  reference by which we are disclosed to ourselves as bodily subjects 
 situated in the world. 3 
 But the body-as-subject also shapes experience in another way. When 
we perceive the coff ee mug, we don’t simply see it in objective or recogni-
tional terms, say, merely as a thing instantiating diff erent properties such 
as color, shape, texture, and so on. Rather, the coff ee mug is perceptually 
disclosed  as meaningful . An important aspect of our experience is thus 
to perceive the mug as soliciting a range of potential actions (grasping, 
picking up, throwing, etc.), specifi ed both by our body’s sensorimotor 
capacities and by the context in which we encounter it (in the kitchen, 
on the desk in our study, in the dishwasher, etc.). 4 In this way, the body-
as- subject functions as a transparent constraint on our experience of self 
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and world. Although it doesn’t show up as an object like other objects 
in the world, the body-as-subject is nevertheless ‘always near me, always 
there for me’, as Merleau-Ponty observes; yet ‘it is never really in front of 
me…it remains marginal to all my perceptions’. 5 Similarly, Sartre writes 
that ‘the body is present in every action although invisible…Th e body is 
 lived and not  known ’. 6 
 Of course, the body can, and often does, become an object of  thematic 
attention. In contrast to the fi rst-person perspective of the body-as- 
subject, we can adopt a third-person perspective on our body. For exam-
ple, we can scrutinize individual body parts such as the hand we hold 
up in front of us or the fl abby midsection we gaze at disdainfully in 
the mirror. Usually, the body-as-subject eff aces itself within the fl uid 
performance of world-directed actions—again, it remains in the back-
ground, ‘marginal to all my perceptions’, as Merleau-Ponty puts it—but 
if something breaks down or goes wrong, our body suddenly moves to 
the  foreground of our attention: for example, if we feel lower back pain 
while reading at our desk or stumble while reaching for a passing shot 
during a tennis match. In these cases, we become abruptly aware of our 
body as a thing  impeding our action. Rather than tacitly organizing and 
enabling experience, it now explicitly disrupts it; when the implicit body-
as- subject becomes explicit (i.e., a thematic object), the usually inhabited 
or automated bodily processes characterizing the transparent functioning 
of the body-as-subject become disturbed. 7 
 In addition to distinguishing these two modes of embodiment, 
 phenomenologists argue that descriptions of embodied experience are 
incomplete without a consideration of the way they are mediated by 
various forms of  aff ect : emotions, moods, and other feeling states. For 
example, we experience or relate to our body and its capacities diff erently 
when tired or anxious, say, in contrast to when we feel energetic or elated. 
Moreover, these aff ective dimensions of embodiment shape how the  world 
shows up for us in our experience. Heidegger famously argues that moods 
are world-disclosing: ‘ Th e mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-
in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible fi rst of all to direct oneself 
toward something .’ 8 Th is phenomenological observation about the world-
disclosing power of aff ect is supported by diff erent empirical studies. In 
one series of studies, subjects were found to estimate the incline of a grade 
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to be steeper when wearing a heavy backpack as opposed to not wearing 
one, or feeling fatigued as opposed to refreshed. 9 Another study found 
that subjects’ perception of grade incline is even shaped by psychosocial 
factors and their associated aff ects. Individuals judged hills steeper when 
alone than when in the presence of a supportive partner, or even when 
simply  imagining the presence of a supportive partner. 10 
 In sum, phenomenologists argue that basic structures of embodiment 
and aff ectivity modulate our experience of self, others, and the world; 
our bodily presence to self and world is mediated by aff ectivity. 11 How 
this is so—and how these bodily and aff ective structures, as well as their 
modulatory eff ects, may be altered in MS and schizophrenia—will be 
more apparent in the subsequent analysis. To be clear, in what follows, 
we do not posit that either the quality of the experience of diminished 
embodiment and aff ectivity or the nature of the underlying structural 
disruptions is identical in MS and schizophrenia. Rather, we suggest that 
the disruptions of embodiment and aff ectivity in MS and schizophrenia 
and their diverse experiential manifestations highlight the importance of 
these basic structures for the constitution of a sense of self and worldly 
relatedness also in normal conditions. 
 Diminished Embodiment and Affectivity in MS 
and Schizophrenia 
 MS is a very rare form of congenital oculofacial paralysis, typically 
 complete and bilateral, resulting from maldevelopment of the sixth and 
seventh cranial nerves; estimations suggest that MS aff ects approximately 
0.0002–0.002 % of births. 12 Along with oculofacial paralysis, which 
leads to atrophy and gives the face a smooth complexion with a slack 
half-open mouth, individuals with MS also exhibit other abnormalities: 
abnormal tongue, hypodontia [i.e., missing teeth due to developmental 
failure (tooth agenesis)], diffi  culty sucking and eating, limb defects [such 
as club foot or syndactyly (i.e., abnormal connection of fi ngers or toes)], 
and general problems with motor skills, coordination, and balance. 13 In 
light of these physical abnormalities, it may seem trivial to characterize 
MS as involving a disruption of embodiment. However, as we shall see, 
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there are subtle  phenomenological alterations of embodiment, aff ectivity, 
and self-experience in MS that resist an exclusively neurophysiological 
characterization. 
 In the case of schizophrenia, phenomenologically informed 
 psychopathologists have long argued that the generative disorder of 
schizophrenia is a disturbance of the self. Th is basic intuition was devel-
oped more or less explicitly in nearly all foundational texts on the concept 
of schizophrenia. 14 For example, Minkowski argued that schizophrenia 
‘does not originate in the disorders of judgment, perception or will, but 
in a disturbance of the innermost structure of the self ’. 15 Crucially, the 
‘self ’ disturbed in schizophrenia does not refer to complex linguistically 
or conceptually mediated levels of selfhood, such as narrative identity 
or personhood, but to what has been called the ‘minimal self ’, 16 ‘core 
self ’, 17 or ‘ ipseity ’. 18 Within the phenomenological tradition,  ipseity refers 
to a fundamental confi guration of consciousness, that is, its fi rst-personal 
givenness; the concept of  ipseity strives to capture the implicit sense of 
 coinciding with oneself and one’s experiences at any given moment. 19 
 For example, when we perceive or refl ect upon something, we are 
implicitly or pre-refl ectively aware that  we are the ones who perceive or 
refl ect; there is no distance between our experience and ourselves. To put 
it diff erently, the self, in this minimal sense ( ipseity ), is not something 
prior to or below the fl ux of experience, somehow linking it together, 
but a feature of the very manifestation of experience. 20 Th is self- presence 
or self-intimacy usually permeates all our experiential modalities and 
secures an elusive yet enduring and vital feeling of ‘I-me-myself ’. In 
schizophrenia, however, this basic sense of self-intimacy is often threat-
ened or rendered unstable. As Schneider puts it, ‘[certain] disturbances 
of self-experience show the greatest degree of schizophrenic specifi city. 
Here we refer to those disturbances of fi rst-personal givenness ( Ich-heit ) 
or “mineness” ( Meinhaftigkeit )’. 21 In contemporary phenomenological 
psychopathology, the disturbance of the self in schizophrenia is most 
comprehensively articulated in the so-called  ipseity disturbance model, 22 
which involves two complementary distortions: diminished self-aff ection 
(i.e., attenuated sense of existing as a living subject of awareness and 
action) and hyper-refl exivity (i.e., exaggerated and alienating forms of 
self-consciousness). 
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 During the last two decades, empirical research has consistently 
 documented that certain anomalies of self-experience (i.e., ‘self-disorders’) 
aggregate signifi cantly in schizophrenia spectrum disorders but not in 
other mental disorders. 23 In brief, self-disorders are non-psychotic, expe-
riential anomalies. Th ey exhibit a trait-like quality, typically date back to 
childhood or early adolescence, and they tend to persist after remission 
from a frank psychotic episode. As we shall see, some of these self- disorders 
refl ect alterations in the basic sense of self-presence and embodiment. 24 
Within the phenomenological literature, Stanghellini and Fuchs have 
argued that an essential feature of schizophrenia is a specifi c kind of 
 disembodiment . 25 Stanghellini employs the terms of ‘disembodied spirits’ 
and ‘deanimated bodies’ to describe a peculiar kind of mechanization or 
objectifi cation of the body-as-subject in schizophrenia. 26 Fuchs similarly 
describes a ‘disembodiment of the self ’ in schizophrenia in which the 
lived body’s usual transparency becomes opaque and hinders the patient 
from inhabiting the body in the usual, unproblematic sense. 27 On both 
Stanghellini’s and Fuchs’s accounts, disembodiment in schizophrenia is 
intrinsically tied to the basic disturbance of  ipseity . 
 Experiential Manifestations of Diminished 
Embodiment and Affectivity 
 With these phenomenological concepts in place, we will now explore 
 disruptions of embodiment and aff ectivity in MS and schizophrenia. 
First, we will consider MS before turning to schizophrenia. Although MS 
has received considerably less attention than schizophrenia—likely due 
to its rarity—there are nevertheless sources available that can help high-
light experiential dimensions of this condition pertinent to the  present 
discussion. 
 In a series of books and papers, Jonathan Cole has collected narratives 
of people living with MS—fi rst-person insights into the subtle  alterations 
of embodiment and aff ectivity distinctive of this condition. 28 For our 
purposes, it is noteworthy that many individuals with MS report persis-
tently experiencing an attenuated sense of their body-as- subject ; rather, 
they appear to predominantly experience their body in a markedly 
13 Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome 255
impersonal, almost  object -like way. Th is is an especially prominent feature 
of their early childhood experience. Cole and his co-author Henrietta 
Spalding (who has MS) seek to capture this type of bodily experience with 
their notion of the MS subject as ‘Cartesian child’, 29 emphasizing how a 
lack of bodily intimacy, which people with MS often report, may lead to 
a persistent sense of  detachment or  alienation from one’s own body. For 
example, James (now in his fi fties), describes how this experience has 
been with him as long as he can remember: ‘I have a notion which has 
stayed with me over much of my life—that it is possible to live in your 
head; entirely in your head (…) I think there’s a lot of dissociation. But 
I  think I get trapped in my mind or my head’. 30 Another individual, 
Celia, describes an even more articulated sense of disembodiment, which 
she claims shaped her fundamental sense of self from a very early age:
 I never thought I was a person; I used to think I was a collection of bits. 
I  thought I had all these diff erent doctors looking after all the diff erent 
bits…‘Celia’ was not there; that was a name people called the collection of 
bits. I did not like my feet; I liked my spirit because I was strong as a child. 
I like my brain…Even though I was a collection of bits I always knew there 
was something strong inside that I had a mental dialogue with, but it was 
not the physical body; it was very separate from the physical. 31 
 Celia describes here a profound lack of bodily self-intimacy; she 
regards herself not as a locus of agency and experience but almost as 
object-like, as a disparate ‘collection of bits’. Th is lack of self- intimacy 
meant that she never experienced herself as fully immersed in the 
spontaneous movements, play, and intersubjective  reciprocity that are 
crucial parts of childhood development. 32 Although this lack of self-
intimacy has diminished somewhat in adulthood, it nevertheless seems 
that Celia still does not have a robust sense of her body-as-subject. 
She does not experience her body as a fl uidly integrated unity—a tacit, 
smoothly functioning system facilitating her interactions with the 
world and others. Instead, Celia reports consistently adopting a third-
person perspective on her own body, including occasions (e.g., gestur-
ing while speaking) when the body would normally recede transparently 
into the background.
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 All my gestures are voluntary, even now aged 46.  Everything I do, I think 
about …All the things I am doing, whether turning my head or moving my 
hands, is all self-taught. I learnt from observation as an adult…When I was 
a child, I could not gesture, because I was a collection of bits. My body was 
not me, so expression in it, with it, would not be from me either. It was not 
a joined-up feeling. Th ere was a huge bit missing;  with the lack of balance, 
mobility, and problems with coordination, you don’t get a sense of self . 33 
 Bereft of an enduring sense of bodily self-intimacy and attendant 
sense of self, Celia thus adopts a hyper-refl ective stance toward her body, 
 gestures, and actions. She consciously monitors and pays attention to her 
body instead of pre-refl ectively living  through it (as we shall see below, this 
hyper-refl ective stance is reminiscent of some patients with schizophrenia). 
Others with MS off er similar accounts. For example, James says he’s only 
recently begun using his arms to gesture while speaking—but it continues 
to be a deliberate, eff ortful exercise. 34 Similarly, Lydia says: ‘Instead of facial 
expression I use my hands and shoulders, and my voice, both in its tone 
and what I say; I construct it all very carefully…I have to monitor these 
things all the time…None of this is automatic. ’ 35 She reports consciously 
studying how others gesture and express emotions and then, over time, 
deliberately incorporating these practices into her own repertoire. 
 To return to a concept introduced earlier, the phenomenological 
 signifi cance of these fi rst-person accounts is that individuals with MS 
often feel as though they do not wholly coincide with their lived body, 
their body-as-subject. Instead, the body is typically related to, or experi-
entially manifest, as an  object . And this diminished sense of bodily self-
intimacy may be associated with diminished aff ectivity. Some individuals 
with MS report feeling a qualitative ‘absence’ or diminishment in their 
emotional life. For example, Eleanor says:
 [I]f I go back to my late teen years, I was not very embodied as a person and 
the physical nature of attraction was some way away…At this stage, I did 
not feel anything [i.e., romantic] physically; even though I had matured 
physically, I had no feeling. Like the other feelings it had not kicked in. 36 
 Along the same lines, James reports that he  intellectualizes feelings 
instead of living in and through them: ‘I sort of think happy or I think 
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sad, not really saying or recognizing actually feeling happy or feeling sad.’ 
Th is intellectualizing tendency even includes his experience of falling in 
love with his wife: ‘I think initially I was thinking I was in love with 
her. It was some time later when I realized that I really felt love.’ 37 With 
respect to his embodied and aff ective life, he further states: ‘I’ve often 
thought of myself as a spectator rather than as a participant.’ 38 Finally, 
Celia describes similar emotional experience dating back to childhood: ‘I 
did not express emotion. I am not sure that I felt emotion, as a defi ned 
concept. At my birthday parties I did not get excited. Th ere were people 
around excited, but I followed what they did.’ 39 She continues: ‘I don’t 
think I was happy, or even had the concept of, happiness as a child. 
I was saddened by being in pain or having horrid things like a blood 
test.’ 40 Surely Celia was capable of feeling  some emotion. What these 
quotes appear to suggest, rather, is not an utter absence of emotion but 
more likely a restricted range of emotional sensitivity, responsivity, and 
expressivity. 41 
 In sum, we have seen that individuals with MS often experience a 
diminished sense of embodiment, which is consequential of but, in our 
view, not reducible to their specifi c physiological abnormalities. In other 
words, the typically persistent and pervasive lack of bodily self-intimacy 
does not pertain exclusively to, as might be predicted, oculofacial paraly-
sis but to a more general overall feeling of being disconnected and at a 
distance from one’s body-as-subject. Invariably, this experiential distance 
entails a feeling of bodily self-alienation (variously refl ected in complaints 
such as feeling ‘trapped in my mind or my head’, ‘separation from the 
physical body’, ‘collection of bits’, etc.) and, at least in the cases we have 
discussed, an interdependent, observational, or self-monitoring stance 
toward one’s own body, agency, and gestures as  objects , which may further 
increase feelings of alienation. Th is experiential distance can also aff ect 
the individuals’ emotional life to the extent that emotions appear as if 
‘absent’ (as in the case of Eleanor) or only accessible through refl ection 
or ‘intellectualization’ (as in the case of James) rather than pre-refl ectively 
felt and lived through. In our view, these forms of diminished embodi-
ment and aff ectivity, which revolve around disruptions of the usually 
taken-for-granted and implicit processes of the body-as-subject are cen-
tral to the experience of being disconnected from oneself in MS (refl ected 
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in statements such as ‘being a spectator to rather than as a participant in 
one’s own life’, ‘not feeling like a person’, ‘lacking a sense of self ’, etc.). 
 We now turn to schizophrenia. As we shall see, there are certain 
 illuminating similarities between experiences of diminished embodiment 
and aff ectivity in MS and schizophrenia. However, when unraveling the 
 phenomenological complexities of these experiences and their embed-
dedness in the underlying psychopathological Gestalt of schizophrenia, 
some crucial diff erences come to light, gravitating especially around 
disturbances of  ipseity . 
 Many patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders experience 
 problems with their embodiment. For example, ‘K’, 25 years old, 
describes a complicated relationship with her own body:
 I have always had a diffi  cult relation to my body (…) It’s as if there is a 
distance between my body and my mind. It’s like my mind is a little 
 puppeteer, sitting far away, controlling my body. It’s not like I see myself 
from above or something. But it’s like I’m not in my body or not attached 
to it. It’s like my body is an appendix that hangs below me. My body feels 
alien to me (…) I wish I could be free of it. 42 
 Here, ‘K’ describes phenomena that in the clinical, self-disorders– 
oriented research literature are called ‘psycho-physical split’, referring to 
the experience  as if the mind and the body somehow do not fi t together 
or are disconnected, and ‘somatic depersonalization’, referring to the 
experience of perceiving one’s own body or parts of it as strange, alien, 
disconnected, and so on. When ‘K’ describes her mind as a ‘puppeteer’, 
she is not describing an out-of-body experience (‘It’s not like I see myself 
from above or something’). Rather, she is conveying an experience of not 
feeling truly present  in her body and  alienated from it (‘it’s like I’m not in 
my body or not attached to it’; ‘My body feels alien to me’). Such expe-
riences are quite common in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, though 
their specifi c quality and articulation may vary—for example, ‘the body 
feels awkward as if it does not really fi t. It feels like the body is not really 
me, as if it is rather a machine controlled by my brain’, 43 or ‘I feel strange, 
I am no longer in my body, it is someone else; I sense my body but it is 
far away, some other place.’ 44 In schizophrenia, diminished embodiment 
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may take on an alien or quasi-mechanical character: ‘I’m blessed with a 
bladder-emptier that I can turn on and off , and an anal expeller’, 45 or ‘I’m 
a psycho-machine’. 46 For Peter, 18 years old, his initial, non-psychotic 
experiences of psycho-physical split, somatic depersonalization, and loss 
of control of bodily movements evolved into vague ideas about external 
infl uence (‘it sometimes feels as if someone else is performing my actions. 
It’s as if it’s not me. I feel like a puppet’) and eventually into psychosis 
with delusions of control. 47 
 Most importantly, the unstable self-presence or self-intimacy in 
 schizophrenia is not restricted to the bodily domain but is also often perva-
sively manifest in other modalities of consciousness (thinking,  perceiving, 
feeling, etc.). For example, Peter describes persistent feelings of not being 
fully present in the world: ‘It’s as if I’m inside a glass dome (…) every-
thing seems so far away as if there is an invisible wall I cannot penetrate.’ 48 
Experiences of ‘diminished presence’, which also are manifestations of the 
disturbance of ipseity, often entail a felt distance toward the world and 
may involve a decreased capacity to become aff ected, touched, or moved 
by others or events and to emotionally respond to such stimulations. Th is 
is the case for Peter, who states: ‘I don’t truly feel the world, because I 
don’t feel anything inside’; he refers to the world as a ‘dream world’ and 
himself as a ‘zombie’ or ‘a shell devoid of emotions’. 49 Such experiences 
typically aff ect the spontaneous immersion in the shared social world 
and the ability to interact with others in a smooth, fl uid, and context- 
sensitive manner. Th e failing sense of self-presence may also be associated 
with an experience of not being fully awake, as if the very luminosity of 
consciousness was somehow diminished—for example, ‘I am only 70 % 
conscious’ 50 ; ‘I feel a sort of emptiness in my head as if I am not awake. I 
feel detached or airy as if I am not present’ 51 ; ‘My consciousness is not as 
whole as it should be’; ‘I am half-awake.’ 52 
 Furthermore, many patients with incipient schizophrenia describe a 
variety of interdependent cognitive disturbances. Some of these are worth 
highlighting here because they indicate important diff erences between 
schizophrenia and MS, which should not to be overlooked. For example, 
some (but not all) thoughts, typically with a neutral or trivial content, 
may appear somehow alien or anonymous to the patient as if he himself 
has not generated them (‘my thoughts feel strange as if they aren’t really 
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coming from me’). 53 ‘Th ought pressure’, that is, the experience of  having 
many thematically unrelated thoughts or trains of thought occurring 
simultaneously or immediately after each other, with a loss of meaning, 
is another frequently found experience in schizophrenia spectrum disor-
ders; one patient described this experience with the analogy of ‘rockets 
shooting in all directions at once. It’s one big chaos’. 54 ‘Th ought pres-
sure’ may be linked to ‘spatialization’ of thoughts, that is, an anomalous 
experience of thoughts not as subjectively lived through but rather as 
quasi-objective  things , for example, localized to specifi c parts of the brain, 
physically moving around inside the head or pressing on the inside of the 
skull. Patients also often report listening to their own thoughts spoken 
aloud internally with they own voice or reading their own thoughts as if 
they were subtitles on a fi lm. In brief, these various experiences testify to 
the fact that the unstable sense of self-presence or self-intimacy in schizo-
phrenia transcends beyond the bodily and aff ective dimensions into other 
modalities of consciousness, which, by contrast, appear unaff ected in MS 
(e.g., cognition, perception). 
 Finally, we will return to ‘K’ and briefl y discuss some of the problems 
she encounters when interacting with others:
 I always feel that it is like enormously feigned when I have some social 
interaction. It feels false, like I can’t react naturally or sincerely like  everyone 
else… I have the experience that there are two of me: the one that interacts 
with someone and then there is the real me, who sits there behind. For 
example, ‘I sense that the one I’m talking to fi nds my statement a little 
transgressive, so I add a little humour here to establish an ironic 
 distance. Th at may perhaps… yes, that worked well…’ And I do it, like, 
 simultaneously. I don’t feel present at all. 55 
 Here, ‘K’ describes hyper-refl ectivity that takes the form of an  excessive 
self-monitoring, operating alongside her social interaction and compro-
mising her sense of being present in social situations. With regard to 
certain aspects (e.g., hyper-refl ection, self-monitoring), her description 
may appear similar to those of patients with MS (e.g., Henrietta’s and 
Lydia’s similar reports of self-consciously monitoring every gesture and 
movement when interacting with others). However, we should not fail to 
notice the underlying schizophrenic vulnerability that is also indicated in 
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this vignette (e.g., ‘I have the experience that there are  two of me ’), which 
clearly distinguishes ‘K’s’ diffi  culties from those of patients with MS. Her 
feeling of social interactions being ‘false’ and of not being able to ‘react 
naturally or sincerely like everyone else’ is deeply rooted in her persistent 
feeling of not being truly human, which dates to early childhood—‘I 
feel like I’m not a natural human being or a proper human being or 
something like that.’ 56 Th e unsettling feeling of being radically, yet often 
ineff ably, diff erent from others is very common in schizophrenia and 
typically at the very heart of the patient’s suff ering. 
 In sum, we have discussed various clinical examples of diminished 
embodiment and aff ectivity in schizophrenia that gravitate around dis-
ruptions of the fi rst-personal articulation of experience. As we have seen, 
the ipseity disturbance gives rise to a multiplicity of interconnected and 
mutually implicative anomalous self-experiences that threatens one’s 
most intimate, foundational sense of self and enables a radical form of 
self-alienation to grow from within the disturbed subjectivity, potentially 
resulting in psychotic experiences of being controlled by an external 
force, persecuted or addressed by a hallucinatory other. 
 Conclusion 
 On a surface level, we found similarities among experiences of diminished 
embodiment and aff ectivity in MS and schizophrenia, respectively. Th ese 
include hyper-refl ection, self-monitoring, and profound bodily self-
alienation, characterized by a pervasive tendency in both MS and 
schizophrenia to experience and relate to the lived body (i.e., body-
as- subject) primarily as an object. In both MS and schizophrenia, the 
 body-as- subject’s transparency—the tacit, mediating processes enabling it 
to function smoothly and unobtrusively in the world—appear disrupted. 
Although the origin and nature of these disruptions are very diff erent in 
the two conditions, in both cases the body and it capacities are no longer 
simply inhabited or pre-refl ectively lived through but rather explicated in 
a concrete, objectifying, and alienating manner. Notably, we also found 
crucial diff erences between experiences of diminished embodiment and 
262 J.  Krueger and M.G. Henriksen
aff ectivity in MS and schizophrenia, refl ecting the diff erent underlying 
pathologies. 
 Our study lends support to phenomenologists’ claims concerning the 
importance of embodiment, aff ectivity, and intercorporeity (or embod-
ied intersubjectivity) for the constitution of a sense of self in abnormal 
as well as normal conditions. For phenomenologists, the fl uid oscillation 
between the body-as-subject and the body-as-object highlights a ‘bodily 
ambiguity’ at the heart of our embodied experience: as embodied sub-
jects, we are neither wholly subjects nor wholly objects, but somehow 
always both. Looking at cases where this ambiguity is disrupted, and the 
cascade of anomalous experiences such disruptions may entail, points to 
the constitutive role this bodily ambiguity plays in shaping our general 
way of inhabiting, experiencing, and engaging with the world. 
 Finally, we suggest that utilizing phenomenological resources to address 
experiences of diminished embodiment and aff ectivity in MS and schizo-
phrenia may enable us to better understand what it sometimes is like to 
live with these conditions and potentially off er targets for future research 
and therapeutic intervention. As phenomenology and cognitive sci-
ence continue to intersect in the twenty-fi rst century, new interventions 
become possible in light of our research here. For example, interventions 
striving to enforce the individuals’ experience of embodiment could eas-
ily be included as part of the treatment in both MS and schizophrenia. 
In the case of MS, interventions designed to help individuals with MS 
develop alternative embodied communication strategies (e.g., gestures) 
to compensate for their lack of facial expressivity seem relevant. 57 In the 
case of schizophrenia, interventions designed to strengthen the patient’s 
unstable or wavering sense of self-presence or ipseity are strongly needed. 
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